Towards Conceptualizing EU Cybersecurity Law. ZEI Discussion Paper C253 2019

The European Union has a wide spectrum of legal instruments addressing various aspects of cybersecurity, ranging from electronic communication laws, data protection regulations through network and information security legislation to instruments dealing with cybercrime and recommendations on coordinated response to large scale cyber incidents – all this without having a commonly accepted definition of cybersecurity

FOG-1 and GATA-1 act sequentially to specify definitive megakaryocytic and erythroid progenitors

During haematopoiesis, megakaryocytes and erythrocytes derive from a common precursor called preMegE. This study reports a role for the transcription factor FOG-1 in specification of preMegEs, while GATA-1 is subsequently required for erythroid-lineage commitment

The language of sedation in end-of-life care: The ethical reasoning of care providers in three countries

The application of ethically controversial medical procedures may differ from one place to another. Drawing on a keyword and text-mining analysis of 156 interviews with doctors and nurses involved in end-of-life care ('care providers'), differences between countries in care providers' ethical rationales for the use of sedation are reported. In the United Kingdom, an emphasis on titrating doses proportionately against symptoms is more likely, maintaining consciousness where possible. The potential harms of sedation are perceived to be the potential hastening of social as well as biological death. In Belgium and the Netherlands, although there is concern to distinguish the practice from euthanasia, rapid inducement of deep unconsciousness is more acceptable to care providers. This is often perceived to be a proportionate response to unbearable suffering in a context where there is also greater pressure to hasten dying from relatives and others. This means that sedation is more likely to be organised like euthanasia, as the end 'moment' is reached, and family farewells are organised before the patient is made unconscious for ever. Medical and nursing practices are partly responses to factors outside the place of care, such as legislation and public sentiment. Dutch guidelines for sedation largely tally with the practices prevalent in the Netherlands and Belgium, in contrast with those produced by the more international European Association for Palliative Care whose authors describe an ethical framework closer to that reportedly used by UK care providers.This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) [grant no: RES-062-23-2078], the Research Foundation Flanders (BE), the Flemish Cancer Association (BE), the Research Council of Ghent University (BE), the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NL and the Netherlands Organization for Health Research and Development (NL)

The future of the European Union : desmisting the debate

In the last decade, the EU’s policy on cybersecurity has changed significantly, both as to its referent objects and priority level. While the 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy focused almost exclusively on the importance of cybersecurity for the proper functioning of the single market, its 2017 version also contained an analysis of malicious cyber activities that threaten the political integrity of Member States and the EU as a whole. As the field’s level of complexity grows and forward-looking initiatives are constantly being proposed in order to promote cyber resilience across the EU, it is increasingly challenging the Union in the process of coordinating and implementing the planned actions. Cybersecurity has also become a national security issue entangling private and public, external and internal, civilian, and military issues making it necessary, but very challenging to widen and deepen ties among stakeholders in the EU. Yet cybersecurity governance is fragmented at the EU level, and there is an evident lack of trust that prevents effective cooperation among stakeholders on crucial aspects of the process. This contribution argues that as a result, cybersecurity policy in the EU remains unsystematic and predominantly reactive in nature, addressing the issuespecific incidents that have already occurred, although in our technology-dependent societies more emphasis should be placed on prevention. Therefore, in a natural scholarly quest for explanations, this chapter focuses on the development and main elements of the EU’s cybersecurity policy, followed by mapping the attitudes of cybersecurity stakeholders and their normative objectives in the context of EU integration in this domain.peer-reviewe

Towards a ‘Cyber Maastricht’: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back

This chapter evaluates the EU’s cybersecurity policy from four perspectives – neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, post-functionalism, and the imperial paradigm. A search for a theory-based framework is performed to ensure that the analysis in this chapter is completed within a set of boundaries, and does not stray into speculation about the EU’s prospective strategic steps. Using this contribution’s findings and elaborations, a proposal on the policy-associated model is made. Having observed the empirical data, while analytically reflecting on actuality, it can be argued that a ‘Cyber Maastricht’ is long overdue

The EU’s cybersecurity: a strategic narrative of a cyber power or a confusing policy for a local common market?

In this article, firstly, we identify and examine the process of formation of the EU’s narratives about (its) cyber power. Secondly, we establish a discussion framework to highlight the methodological relevance of the imperial paradigm, cyber power Europe and strategic narrative theory for a multidisciplinary debate on global geo-strategic redesign, in which the EU takes part. Thirdly, we look into bilateral and multilateral forums and processes that deal with cybersecurity and in which the EU participates, in order to understand more specifically how the EU is projecting its cyber-power narratives internationally and how cybersecurity-associated challenges impact current dynamics in other policy domains in the field of international relatio

EU Common Position on International Law and Cyberspace

The discussion on international law applicable to cyber operations has shifted from asking whether international law applies to cyberspace to how it applies. Recently the European Union declared in its renewed cybersecurity strategy the ambition to develop common EU position on the application of international law in cyberspace. As part of a broader vision in striving for leadership on standards, norms and regulatory frameworks in cyberspace, the joint communication underlined the need for taking a more proactive stance in the discussions at the United Nations and other relevant international fora. However, less than half of the European Union Member States have issued a public statementon the interpretation of international law in cyberspace and hence, reaching a consensus on the interpretation of relevant concepts of international law appears a challenge. This article provides an overview of the current status of EuropeanUnion Member States’ public statements on international law applicable to cyber operations, identifies the domains of international law where convergence of views can be observed and highlights the areas with notable differences